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BUSINESS STRATEGY AND EARNINGS QUALITY   
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using the Miles and Snow (1978) strategy typology, this study investigates whether business 
strategy is associated with the quality of reported earnings. In a sample of U.S. listed firms, 
we predict and find that defender-strategy firms are associated with higher levels of earnings 
management and prospector-strategy firms are associated with higher levels of accounting 
conservatism. However, this relation between business strategy and earnings quality is altered 
during high and low economic growth periods. In high-growth periods, while prospector 
firms exhibit lesser accounting conservatism, defender firms exhibit lesser earning 
management. In low-growth periods, the prospector firms become more conservative in 
reporting while the defender firms engage in more aggressive earnings management. Our 
findings provide direct evidence of the link between business strategy and earnings quality.   
Keywords: business strategy, earnings quality; accounting conservatism; earnings 
management.  
 
Paper type: Research paper 
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BUSINESS STRATEGY AND EARNINGS QUALITY   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last two decades or so, researchers have been investigating the determinants and 
consequences of earnings quality (see Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010). However, a central 
issue that has received very limited attention is the role of business strategy1 in determining 
earnings quality. To the extent that investment decisions and accounting choices are jointly 
made (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990), earnings quality is potentially a function of business 
strategy because investment decisions flow from business strategy. Using the Miles and 
Snow (1978) strategy typology and an objective strategy-proxy based on Snow and Hrebiniak 
(1980), we document that defender-strategy firms are associated with higher levels of 
earnings management and prospector-strategy firms are associated with higher levels of 
accounting conservatism. We further examine the role of wider economic environments on 
the relation between business strategy and earnings quality. Financial reporting behavior of 
prospector-strategy firms and defender-strategy firms   during high and low economic growth 
periods appears to be quite opposite. We find that during high (low) economic growth 
periods, prospector firms exhibit less (more) accounting conservatism whereas defender firms 
exhibit lesser (more) earnings management.     
 Our primary measure of accounting conservatism is the Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) 
measure of non-operating negative accruals measure. We define conservatism as “a function 
of the firm’s cumulative accounting policies which arise from both discretionary and 
mandatory policy decisions where, within each, there nevertheless are degrees of discretion” 
(Artiach and Clarkson, 2011, p. 4). Our primary measure of earnings management is the 
absolute discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995).   
We analyzed two samples of U.S. listed companies over the period 1999-2009. In 
particular, we analyzed 23,390 firm-years for testing the association between earnings 
management and business strategy, and 14,729 firm-years for testing the relation between 
accounting conservatism and business strategy. We argue that, to date, associations present 
                                                          
1 In this paper, we focus on business-level strategy (i.e., “How do we compete in this business?”) as opposed to 
corporate-level strategy (i.e., “What businesses should we engage in?”)  (Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Snow and 
Hambrick, 1980). 
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between business strategy, investor expectations and financial reporting have been largely 
ignored by researchers, resulting in an unexplained bias present within the financial 
accounting decision making process. This unknown bias has resulted in investors receiving 
an incomplete picture of firm performance as well as inaccurate information regarding the 
success of the implemented firm strategies. As such, without research to provide awareness 
of the plausible association between business strategy and earnings quality, investors will 
continue to be misled (through firm financial statements).   
Therefore this paper serves to inform investors, accountants, managers, auditors and 
regulators on the association between business strategies and earnings quality, allowing these 
stakeholders to fully understand the true nature of firm performance. We propose that, in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC), this literature is particularly relevant in that it 
can contribute to a wave of new research-led regulation that seeks to limit the systemic 
effects of corporate collapse through better communication between investors and firm 
managers. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss business 
strategy in general and develop hypotheses by exploring the link between business strategy 
and financial reporting quality. Section III proposes the research methodology. Section IV 
discusses the sample selection produce and provides descriptive statistics.  In Section V, we 
discuss our test rests. Section VI reports various sensitivity tests. In Section VII, we offer 
some conclusions.   
II. BUSINESS  STRATEGY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING 
 Business Strategy 
The concept of strategy was introduced in organizational literature and advanced profoundly 
during the 1950s by researchers at the Harvard Business School (Snow and Hambrick, 1980). 
Chandler defines strategy as “the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of 
the enterprise and the adoption of resources necessary for carrying out these goals” (1962, p. 
13). Mintzberg (1987) argues that an organizational strategy alludes to a firm’s plans, 
patterns, positions and perspectives. We view business strategy as a consistent set of 
decisions that defines how a firm competes within a given product market. Although there are 
diverse views on what exactly constitutes a strategy, researchers agree on distinguishing 
between strategy formulation and strategy implementation as two distinct phases of a strategy 
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(Snow and Hambrick, 1980). This distinction is important because it allows researchers to 
observe and measure strategy based on firm-level quantitative data. As such, we interpret 
what realized strategy was implemented within the firm (in hindsight) irrespective of the 
strategy formulation process. 
In this study, we concentrate on strategy implementation and measure business-level 
strategy via objective indicators as proposed by Snow and Hambrick (1980). Snow and 
Hrebiniak (1980) note that “the typology of Miles and Snow (1978) is the only one that 
characterizes an organization as a complete system, especially its strategic orientation” (p. 
318). The Miles and Snow (1978) typology classifies firms into prospectors, defenders, 
analyzers, and reactors, depending on the firm’s market orientation. Miles and Snow (1978) 
also note that prospector and defender strategies are the most dominant types. Snow and 
Hambrick (1980) examine the different methods for the categorization of firm strategy within 
this typology and propose (amongst other categorization options) the examination of strategy 
using ‘objective indicators’ based on the collection of financial data of sample firms.    
Employing ‘objective indicators’ for measuring business-level strategy has other 
merits. First, unlike other approaches, this approach controls for perceptual, and to a lesser 
extent, interpretive bias (Snow and Hambrick, 1980). Second, this approach is relatively well-
suited for identifying implemented or realized strategies (Snow and Hambrick, 1980). Third, 
this approach is commonly used by strategy researchers (e.g., Miller and Friesen, 1978; 
Venkatraman and Grant, 1986).  
We build on Snow and Hambrick’s (1980) proposal by using objective data to classify 
firms based on how well they fit into the two strategy orientations: prospectors and defenders. 
Miles and Snow (1978), and Hambrick (1983) note that prospector firms will have a stronger 
commitment to product development and innovation, and frequently alter their products and 
markets. These firms thrive in business environments that are somewhat unpredictable and 
succeed by examining the market constantly for new opportunities. Further, these firms often 
encourage innovation over efficiency. In contrast, defender firms stress efficiency of 
operations and low levels of product development or a strong defense of their existing 
marketplaces (Miles and Snow, 1978). Hambrick (1983) describes defenders as firms which 
tend to compete mainly on price, delivery, or quality; defenders make large investments in 
process engineering; they have mechanistic structures, and they are run primarily under the 
influence of production and accounting executives. Defender firms promote efficiency over 
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innovation and they often build cost efficiency through vertical integration. These firms 
thrive in environments that change slowly. Readers are referred to Miles, Snow, Meyer and 
Coleman (1978) for a fuller treatment on all the four  strategy types.  
Business-level Strategy and Accounting  
We invoke three theories to delineate the connection between business-level strategy and the 
accounting decision making process. These theories are agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), political cost theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) and transaction cost theory (Coase, 
1937).  
Jensen & Meckling (1976) provide a sound starting point in analyzing accounting 
decision maker’s behavior. They hold that the agents of a firm will always make decisions to 
maximize self-interest and will only make decisions in the firm’s best interest where their 
personal interests and those of the firm do not diverge (the problem of managerial agency). 
Hence, managers will act in one of the two ways during the accounting decision making 
process: when their interests are aligned with  those of the owners of the firm, managers will 
make such decisions that promote the firm’s interests in order to further managers’ own 
interests (efficient contracting); when their interests are not aligned with those of the owners, 
managers will make decisions to maximize their self-interest (managerial opportunism). 
During accounting decision making  process, the value of having an ‘objective’ and 
‘impartial’ set of financial statements will likely be considered and weighed against the 
benefits associated with a biased accounting choice that affects earnings quality. Both the 
political cost theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) and the transaction cost theory (Coase, 
1937) explain why firms will have incentives for adopting a biased approach to financial 
reporting.   
In proposing the political cost theory, Watts & Zimmerman (1978) argue that in 
making management decisions (including accounting decisions) managers must consider the 
wider regulatory environment. They further argue that accounting is a form of 
communication that is disseminated (in the case of publicly listed companies) to regulatory 
decision-makers and the wider public (alongside with investors). This dissemination 
illuminates the public’s understandings of individual firms and as such influences the 
decision-making of regulatory bodies. 
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Watts & Zimmerman (1978) note that when the picture in the wider public’s mind is 
one of a large growing firm, the public and their representatives (regulators) will associate 
this with excess and greed and will seek to mitigate the profits achieved by these firms 
through taxes, antitrust suits, product regulation, reduction or loss of awarded government 
contracts and industry regulation; all of which result in a reduction in the earnings capacity 
and wealth of the firm. 
Understanding this, managers who believe that their organization has achieved or may 
achieve a reputation of greed and excess (large and highly profitable) may attempt to 
manipulate the public and regulatory perception of their firm. This manipulation can be 
achieved through the use of public relations staff, community work or through increased 
accounting conservatism (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). Watts and Zimmerman (1978) further 
argue that increased accounting conservatism acts to improve the reputation of the firm by 
reforming the firm’s image, from a greedy firm to a leaner organization.   
Firm  managers who are not concerned with looking highly profitable or overly 
wealthy are likely to focus on accounting policies that maximize investor confidence in the 
firm. These accounting policies include strategies of impartial accounting decision making or 
strategies that maximize reported earnings.  
Coase (1937) defined the boundaries of the firm. Coase (1937) argued that the 
existence of the firm must be the reduction of transaction costs that would otherwise be 
associated with market transactions. A natural implication of this is that firms will be judged 
by potential investors, at least in part, on the basis of how efficient they are in lowering 
transaction costs.  
Firms expanding within existing markets and new markets (prospectors in nature) are 
likely to attract costs associated with such expansion (with the hope of achieving costs 
savings or increased revenue at a future date) and as such are unlikely to be able to be 
compared and evaluated against other firms within the market place. In contrast, firms which 
are identified by investors as market defenders (with little interest in expansion) will be seen 
and evaluated by investors based on the transaction costs that they consistently incur in 
proportion to earnings.   
As such when engaging in accounting decision making, firms that are market 
defenders will be incentivized to smooth earnings to maintain a continued level of transaction 
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costs while the managers of prospector’s firms will place little emphasis on reducing 
transaction costs and instead will conserve potential earnings for future accounting periods 
where they can be more useful to the firm and its managers. 
Owners of firms which adopt defender strategies are likely to place a higher 
expectation of immediate financial performance and smoothness of earnings on these firms, 
because defender firms are likely to be seen by investors as inherently more stable and less 
risky investments to hold. These investor expectations therefore will lead to higher 
performance requirements for the management of defender firms incentivizing the firm’s 
management to make accounting choices that help in meeting investors’ expectation of firm 
performance. In contrast, investors are likely to view prospector firms as more volatile with 
longer term investment prospects and place a lower expectation on immediate financial 
performance and a lower expectation of earnings smoothness. These lower financial 
performance expectations are likely to mitigate the need for an accounting bias in terms of 
earnings management. Instead, agents of prospector firms are likely to conserve earnings for 
future accounting periods (when  the firm may be seen in transition from prospector to 
defender status).  
The above discussion leads us to the following hypotheses: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, prospector firms are more likely to adopt accounting conservatism than 
defender firms. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, defender firms are more likely to engage in earnings management than 
prospector firms.  
Impact of Wider Economic Environments 
In forming strategies, firms always need to consider the wider market, industry, economic 
and regulatory environments.  Because changes in the  external  environments of a firm are  
likely to change the supply and demand forces in the product market in which a firm is 
competing. Hence, realized strategy of firms will, in part, be dependent on ongoing and 
changing emerging strategy where firms seek to respond to changes in the firm’s external 
environment (Mintzberg, 1987). This point is supported by the resource dependency theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), which holds that firms will be shaped by environmental and 
external influences and will alter firm strategy in response to economic (and regulatory) 
events.  
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This change in firm strategy in response to external environments is likely to filter 
down to firm accounting decision making processes. Archambault and Archambault (2003) 
and La Porta et al. (2000) note that firm’s accounting tactics will often be dependent on the 
location of the firm (geographical and regulatory). Further, changes in a firm’s external 
environment influence existing relations between firm characteristics and accounting decision 
making (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003). In sum, the effects of the macro-economic 
environment (as part of the external environment) are likely to alter the magnitude and 
structure of benefits and costs inherent in the accounting decision making processes, and 
thereby, change the relations between accounting policy choices and firm strategy. Thus, we 
hypothesize that: 
H3: The wider economic environment alters the relation between business-level strategy and 
earnings quality.   
Because changes in economic environment are unpredictable and can affect a firm 
either favorably or unfavorably, we are unable to make a signed prediction.  
III.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
First, we examine the level of accounting conservatism present within the annual financial 
statements. Our proxy for accounting conservatism is based on Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) 
measure of negative accruals. They argue that conservative accounting results in persistently 
negative accruals, and more negative accruals reflect more conservative accounting. Without 
management intervention, accruals are expected to reverse over time. Hence, persistent 
cumulative negative accruals represent a conservatism bias with the firm’s accounting system 
rather than the transitory nature of accruals (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011). We focus on non-
operating accruals because operating accruals likely reflect firm economic characteristics 
unrelated to conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 2000). To capture the persistence in 
accumulated accruals over a sufficiently long period, we use a six-year window, consistent 
with Ahmed et al. (2002), Artiach and Clarkson (2011), and Francis et al. (2004). Thus, our 
accounting conservatism measure is: 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 =  −1𝑋 �16∑ 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡6𝑡=1 �     (1) 
            Where, NOPACit is non-operating accruals and TAit is total assets, both for firm i at 
fiscal year-end t.  Similar to Artiach and Clarkson (2011), we multiply the average accruals 
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by -1 to produce a measure that is increasing in conservatism. We use this proxy to 
investigate any possible relation between strategy and accounting conservatism as stated in 
H1.  Specifically, we employ the following econometric model: 
CONit = β0 + β1STRTit + β2LN_ASSETSit + β3F_LEVit + β4G_SALESit + β5M_RISKit + 
Industry and Year controls + εit…………………………………………………………….. (2)  
Where: 
STRTit       = the business strategy of firm i in year t. Adopting the Snow and 
Hambrick (1980) typology, we create a composite strategy score for each 
firm.  The composite score is constructed using the ratio of research and 
development to sales, the ratio of research and development expense per 
employee (Hill and Snell 1988), the ratio  of employees to sales, and the 
Market to Book ratio. Composite scores range from 4 to 16 with  firms 
under 10 considered to be defenders and firms scoring 10 or over 
considered to be prospectors 2;  
LN_ASSETS     = natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t; 
F_LEV = the year-end total liabilities scaled by year-end total assets of firm i in 
year t; 
G_SALES       = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior 
year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t; 
G_PPE           = the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year 
minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior 
year for firm i in year t; 
M_RISK = is a measure of systematic risk which shows the relationship between the 
volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is 
based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price percent 
changes and their relativity to a local market index; 
 
Industry 
controls 
= dummy variables to capture industry differences in accounting 
conservatism; 
Year 
controls 
=  dummy variables to capture year-to-year differences in accounting 
conservatism. 
 
                                                          
2 The coding procedure to classify the firms into the two strategy categories was as follows. First, we computed 
an eight-year average for each of the four strategy proxies listed above.  Second, we divided each strategy-proxy 
into four quartiles and assigned a score of 1 (the lowest quartile, representing traits of a defender) to 4 (the 
highest quartile, representing traits of a prospector).  Finally, a composite strategy score was computed by 
adding the scores of a firm across the four proxies.  Thus, to get a score of 10, a firm has to score  a 3 in at least  
two  proxies with the weakest individual  proxy score of 2 (i.e., 3 + 3 + 2 +2 = 10) or a 4 in at least one proxy if 
the  weakest  individual score is 1 (i.e., 4+3+2+1=10). 
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            Then we examine the level of earnings management present within annual financial 
statements using the proxy ׀DACCRit׀ which is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of 
firm i in year t under the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). We use this proxy to 
investigate any possible relation between strategy and earnings management as stated in H2. 
We employ the following econometric model: 
׀DACCRit׀ = ά0 + ά1STRTit + ά2LN_ASSETSit + ά3F_LEVit + ά4G_SALESit + ά5G_PPEit + 
ά6CFOit + ά7LOSSit + Industry and Year controls + εit……………………………..………….. (3)  
 
where:  
G_PPE           = the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus 
the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for 
firm i in year t; 
CFO = the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets; 
LOSS = loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income before 
extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. 
 
All other variables are as defined before. 
  To test H3, we need a proxy for   wider macro-economic environments.  We argue that 
the real Gross Domestic Production (GDP) growth rates of a country capture the essence of 
the macro-economic environments of that country. Business firms regularly monitor and 
forecast industry and economic outlooks and accordingly make strategic and operating 
decisions suitable to a specific economic environment.  For example, in periods of high (low) 
economic growth, business firms on average are expected to expand (contract) their 
operations. We collected the U.S. real GDP growth rates over the period 1999-2009 from the 
CIA World Factbook. These GDP growth rates are plotted in Figure 1. Through visual 
inspection, we categorize 1999, 2000 and 2004 as high-growth period and 2001, 2007, 2008, 
and 2009 as low-growth period. We consider other years to be moderate-growth period. We 
are interested to test whether the relation between business strategy and earnings quality 
changes across high- and low-growth periods. Hence, we estimate the following models: 
CONit = α0 + α1STRTit + α2GDP_Dummy + α3STRT* GDP_Dummy + α4LN_ASSETSit + 
α5F_LEVit + α6G_SALESit + Industry_Dummy + εit …………………………………………… (4) 
|DACCR|it = ά0 + ά 1STRTit + ά 2 GDP_Dummy + ά 3STRT* GDP_Dummy + ά4 LN_ASSETSit 
+ ά 5F_LEVit + ά 6G_SALESit + ά 7G_PPRit + ά 8CFOit + ά9LOSSit + Industry_Dummy + εit 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….....………….(5) 
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where:  
GDP_Dummy          = a binary variable coded 1  for high U.S. real GDP growth 
years (1999, 2000 and 2004)  and 0  for low U.S. GDP 
growth years (2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009); 
STRT*GDP_Dummy = the interaction term between STRT and GDP_Dummy to 
capture the effect of  the wider macro-economic 
environments  on the relation between business strategy 
and earnings quality.   
 
             All other variables are as defined before.  Obviously, our variables of interest are 
STRT and STRT*GDP_Dummy.  In particular, we are interested to know whether the sign of 
β3 (ά 3) differs from that of β1 (ά 1) in model (4) (model (5) and whether β3 (ά 3) is 
statistically significant.   
              We estimate all our models using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression technique.  
We estimate both pooled and annual samples to enhance credibility of our results. 
IV. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We obtained data for U.S. listed companies from the World Scope database for the period 
1999-2009.  Because our sample period covers the years affected by the GFC, we are able to 
glean the effect of the GFC on the association between business strategy and earnings quality. 
Initially, we identified 25,623 firm-years for the DACCR sample and 16,740 firm-years for 
the CON sample.  For both samples we then go on to exclude financial institutions, funds and 
overseas companies (81 observations in each sample) in order to keep this study within the 
single regulatory environment of the U.S. and to avoid repeated counting of data that may 
take place where a listed company is an investment vehicle or a share fund. Then we exclude 
the top 0.5% and the bottom 0.5% observations for each variable as we considered these to be 
extreme observations (DACCR sample: 1,565 observations; CON sample: 1,465 
observations). Finally, we exclude 587 (465) firm-years from the DACCR  (CON) sample 
because these observations were larger than three times of the absolute value of studentized 
residuals. Thus, our final sample is 14,729 (23,390) firm-years for the CON (DACCR) 
analysis. The sample selection process is reported in Table 1, Panel A. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
         Panel B of Table 1 shows sample composition by year. As Panel B reveals, the firm-
years are widely dispersed across the sample period. Table 1, Panel C shows industry 
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composition of firm-years, which was compiled in accordance with the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). 3  As Panel C shows, Technology (31.7%), Industrials 
(21.9%), Health Care (20.5%) and Consumer Goods (15.2%) are the four most represented 
industries in our earnings management (DACCR) sample. In the accounting conservatism 
(CON) sample, these industries represent 46.3%, 14.0%, 18.1% and 13.8% of the sample, 
respectively.   
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables in relation to the CON sample 
(Panel A) and the DACCR sample (Panel B).  As reported in Panel A, the overall mean metric 
of conservatism (CON) is 0.0019 with year-to-year variations ranging from 0.0069 in 1999 to 
0.0180 in 2008. The overall mean score of STRT is 9.00 with year-to-year variations ranging 
from the lowest of 8.55 in 2009 to the highest of 9.84 in 2000. In Panel B, absolute mean 
discretionary accruals, ׀DACCR׀, for the entire sample is 13.06% of total assets with year-to-
year variation from the lowest of 13.13% in 2006 to the lowest of 15.90% in 2009. Clearly,   
absolute mean discretionary accruals have an upward trend during the GFC (2007-2009). 
Overall mean score for strategy, STRT, is 10 with year-to-year variation from the lowest of 
8.90 in 2009 to 10.32 in 2000. In terms of strategy type, both panels suggest that an 
increasing proportion of firms adopted the defender strategy during the GFC.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 Table 3 reports the Pearson’s correlation coefficients for all the variables (Panel A: 
CON sample; Panel B: DACCR sample). In Panel A, the dependent variable CON is 
significantly positively correlated to business strategy, STRT(r=0.205), at 1% level (two-
tailed test). Such a positive correlation is consistent with the prediction of H1. CON is 
significantly positively correlated with financial leverage (r=0.408), growth in sales revenue 
(r=0.086) and negatively correlated with firm size (r= -0.338), and firm systematic risk (r=-
0.028).  In Panel B, the dependent variable DACCR is significantly negatively correlated with 
STRT(r=-0.301) at 1% level (two-tailed test).  Such a negative correlation is consistent with 
H2.  That is, defender firms (with lower scores in STRT) engage in more aggressive earnings 
management. Other results in Panel B suggest that  growing firms (growth in sales revenue 
and  property plant and equipment investment), firms with larger cash flow from operations 
                                                          
3 Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) was jointly developed by Dow Jones and FTSE in 2004. ICB is 
based on a 4-tier hierarchy and classifies securities into industries, super sectors, sectors and subsectors. 
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are less likely to engage in earnings management while loss-making firms are more likely to 
engage in earnings management.  
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
V. RESULTS 
Accounting Conservatism 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating model (2) on the pooled as well as annual samples.  
As reported in Table 4, the coefficient of STRT is statistically significant across all estimates 
at the 5% or better levels (two-tailed), except for 2003 and 2006. The coefficient of STRT is 
not significant at conventional levels in 2003 while it is significant at 10% level in 2006.  
Because we multiplied our proxy for conservatism by -1 to produce an increasing measure of 
conservatism, the consistently positive coefficient on STRT provides evidence supporting H1.   
That is, prospector firms are more likely to adopt accounting conservatism than defender 
firms. Results in Table 4 further suggest that while larger firms and firms with greater 
systematic risk are less likely to adopt conservatism in reporting, more leveraged firms and 
growing firms are more likely to adopt accounting conservatism. Thus, while debt levels may 
play a monitoring role against aggressive financial reporting, incentives for aggressive 
earnings management decline in growing firms (through growth in sales) allowing these firms 
to adopt more conservative accounting policies. Further, firms with greater systematic risk 
cannot afford to adopt conservatism plausibly to maintain earnings performance. Overall, the 
results in Table 4 suggest that firms which have a higher composite score for strategy 
(prospector firms) are more likely to have higher levels of accounting conservatism (CON). 
 [INSERT TABLE 4] 
Earnings Management 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating model (3) on the pooled as well as annual samples 
over the period 1999-2009. As reported in Table 5, the coefficient of strategy (STRT) is 
consistently negative and statistically significant at 1% level across all the estimates. These 
results are consistent with H2. That is, absolute discretionary accruals are higher for defender 
firms suggesting earnings management by these firms. Among other results, the coefficient of 
LN_ASSETS is negative and significant at 10% level only in 2001 and positive and significant 
at 1% and 5% levels in 2004 and 2005, respectively. Leverage (F_LEV) appears to be 
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positive and statistically significant at 1% level in pooled estimate and most of the annual 
estimates; notable exceptions are 2007, 2008 and 2009. In 2007, the coefficient becomes 
negative and significant at 10% level whereas it is non-significant in 2008 and 2009. Note 
that 2007 marks the year for the onset of the GFC and in 2008 and 2009, the GFC spread 
throughout Europe and other parts of the world.  
 In Table 5, the coefficients for G_SALES and G_PPE are consistently negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level across all estimates. Thus, firms experiencing growth in 
sales and investments in PPE are less likely to engage in earnings management. Prospector 
firms, as opposed to defender firms, are more likely to experience growth in these two areas. 
Further, firms with large, positive operating cash flows are less likely and loss-making firms 
are more likely to engage in earnings management. Overall, the results in Table 5 provide 
strong support for H2 that defender-strategy firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
management via discretionary accruals than prospector firms. 
 [INSERT TABLE 5] 
Effect of GDP Growth Rates on the Relation between Strategy and Earnings quality 
Figure 1 plots the U.S. real GDP growth rates as well as the mean strategy scores of the 
sample firms over the period 1999-2009. A visual inspection of Figure 1 would suggest that 
there is some association between business strategy and the GDP growth rates in the U.S. 
over this period. A Pearson’s correlation test between the sample strategy scores and the GDP 
growth rates over this period confirms a positive and significant relation between the two 
variables (r= 0.107, p<0.001).   
[INSERT FIGURE 1]  
         Table 6 reports the results of estimating models (4) and (5) on the CON and DACCR 
samples. We have a reduced sample size now (11,286 firms) because we excluded 
observations related to the moderate GDP-growth rate years of 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006.  
As shown in Table 6, in the CON sample, the variable STRT is positive and significant at 1% 
level (two-tailed). This result is consistent with the previous results in Table 4. That is, 
prospector firms, on average, exhibit more accounting conservatism than defender firms.  
Interestingly, the negative coefficient of -0.002 (significant at 1% level) on 
STRT*GDP_Dummy suggests that during periods of high GDP growth, prospector firms 
become less-conservative in reporting. This is potentially to match with investor sentiments 
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in a strongly-performing economy. On the other hand, in the DACCR sample, defender firms 
engage in less earnings-management during periods of high GDP growth. This is so because 
the sign on STRT*GDP_Dummy is positive whereas the sign on STRT is negative. Thus, 
during periods of high economic growth, earnings quality of prospector firms declines (less 
conservatism) while earnings quality of defender firms improve (less earnings-management).  
We find consistent results (untabulated) when we set GDP_Dummy to 1 for low GDP-growth 
periods.  That is, in low-GDP growth periods, prospector firms become more conservative in 
reporting whereas defender firms become aggressive in earnings management. In summary, 
we find that prospector and defender firms’ reporting behavior are exactly opposite in both 
high and low economic growth periods.   
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We conduct additional tests to assess the sensitivity of our main results to alternative proxies 
for strategy (STRT), earnings management (DACCR), and accounting conservatism (CON).   
Strategy (STRT) Classification 
Our strategy (STRT) proxy is inspired by the work of Snow and Hambrick (1980). Zahra & 
Pearce (1990) argue that a single proxy for firm strategy is insufficient due to the differences 
in strategy across industries which operate in different ways. This argument holds that, due to 
industry characteristics, the differences between prospectors and defenders over different 
industries and firms may be incorrectly classified when measured in a uniform manner.  
In our analysis, we mitigated this concern by incorporating industry-effects to control 
for any variation in strategy due to industry characteristics.  Further, to ensure that our results 
are not driven by the significant presence of the technology sector in our samples, we now 
exclude the technology sector while re-estimating models (2) and (3). These results are 
reported in Table 7. We exclude the technology sector because of the high rate of innovation, 
market creation, and growth that would be expected in this industry.  
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
Results reported in Table 7 are consistent with our main results reported in Tables 4 
and 5. In the CON sample, the coefficient on STRT is still positive but significant only at 10% 
level (two-tailed). In the DACCR sample, the coefficient of STRT is negative and significant 
17 
 
at the 1% level (two-tailed). Further, in untabulated tests, we treat strategy as a binary 
variable with strategy scores not less than 10 set to 1 (i.e., prospector firms). All other 
strategy scores are set to zero (i.e., defender firms). We find results consistent with our main 
results. 
Alternative Measures for Accounting Conservatism (CON) and Earnings Management 
(DACCR) 
We use the Khan and Watt’s (2009) asymmetric timeliness measure of conservatism as an 
alternative proxy for accounting conservatism and the Jones model (1991) as an alternative 
proxy for earnings management. Results presented in Table 8, based on these alternative 
proxies, are consistent with our main results. In the CON sample, the coefficient of STRT is 
positive and significant at 1% level, which is consistent with the main results. In the DACCR 
sample, consistent with previous results, STRT is negative and significant at the 1% level.   
         In sum, the results are consistent with our predictions even after employing 
alternative proxies for accounting conservatism, earnings management, alternative coding of 
business strategy and exclusion of the technology sector from the analysis. Further, results 
are consistent across samples and across years.  
[INSERT TABLE 8]  
VII. CONCLUSION 
We examine whether business strategy is associated with earnings quality. We also examine 
whether the relation between business strategy and earnings quality is affected by wider 
macro-economic environments. Although accounting policy choices are linked to investment 
decisions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) which follow from business strategy, evidence on 
the link between financial reporting quality and business strategy is sparse. We provide direct 
evidence of the important link between earnings quality and business strategy.   
         Within the Miles and Snow (1978) strategy typology, we classified U.S. listed firms 
into prospector and defender strategy-firms based on the ‘objective-indicators’ approach 
proposed by Snow and Hambrick (1980). We employed four proxies for strategy 
classification: (1) the ratio of research and development expense to sales, (2) research and 
development expense per employee, (3) the ratio of employees to sales, and (4) the market to 
book ratio. Using these four proxies, we computed composite strategy scores for each firm. 
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Firms that scored 10 or more were classified as prospector firms and firms that scored below 
10 were classified as defender firms. In particular, we analyzed a sample of 14,729 firm-years 
to test accounting conservatism and a sample of 23,390 firm-years to test earnings 
management. Our measure of accounting conservatism is based on Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) 
measure of non-operating accruals. We also employed the Khan and Watts (2009) measure of 
conservatism as an alternative proxy for conservatism. Our measure of earnings management 
is the absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al., 1995). We also employed the Jones model (Jones, 1991) as a further sensitivity test of our 
results. In our analysis, we incorporated several control variables including industry and year 
effects. 
         We predicted and found that prospector-strategy firms are associated with higher 
levels of accounting conservatism and defender-strategy firms are associated with higher 
levels of earnings management. However, this relation between business strategy and 
earnings quality is altered during high and low economic growth periods. In high-growth 
periods, while prospector firms exhibit lesser accounting conservatism, defender firms exhibit 
lesser earning management. In low-growth periods, the prospector firms become more 
conservative in financial reporting while the defender firms engage in more aggressive 
earnings management.  
         Our findings have important implications for investors and users of financial 
reporting. That is, an assessment of earnings quality (or lack of it) is incomplete and 
potentially misleading without understanding business strategy of the firms in question.  
Moreover, investors and other users of financial statements can develop insights into firms’ 
earnings quality by trying to identify their business strategy in the first place. Thus, our 
findings provide direct evidence of the link between business strategy and earnings quality. 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 CON DACCR 
No. of observations with no missing values on dependent and 
independent variables for 1999-2009 
16,740 25,623 
-No. of  financial institutions, funds, overseas companies (81) (81) 
-No. of  Observations with any variable registering in the top or 
bottom 0.5%  
(1,465) (1,565) 
- No. of observations with │Studentized residuals│>3 (465) (587) 
Study sample 14,729 23,390 
 
Panel B: Sample by year  
Year CON % DACCR % 
1999 1180 8.0 1980 8.5 
2000 1277 8.7 2143 9.2 
2001 1337 9.1 2245 9.6 
2002 1347 9.1 2224 9.5 
2003 1359 9.2 2276 9.7 
2004 1409 9.6 2363 10.1 
2005 1410 9.6 2322 9.9 
2006 1510 10.3 2282 9.8 
2007 1519 10.3 2190 9.4 
2008 1233 8.4 1745 7.5 
2009 1148 7.8 1620 6.9 
Total 14,729 100 23,390 100 
 
Panel C: Sample by industries 
Industry CON  DACCR 
# Firm -years % # Firm -years % 
Basic Materials 1134 2.9 1449 6.2 
Consumer Goods 2456 13.8 3557 15.2 
Health Care 2880 18.1 4799 20.5 
Industrials 3708 14.0 5122 21.9 
Oil and Gas 411 0.5 493 2.1 
Real Estate 87 1.0 136 0.6 
Technology 3677 46.3 7408 31.7 
Telecommunications 210 1.8 248 1.1 
Utilities 166 1.7 178 0.8 
Total 14,729 100 23,390 100 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Table 2  
Panel A: CON sample (N=14,729) 
Variables All Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
1999 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2000 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2001  
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2002 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2003 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2004 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2005 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2006 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2007 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2008 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2009 
Mean 
SD 
25th (P) 
75th(P) 
 
Dependent  
CON 0.0019 0.0069 0.0064 0.0153 0.0130 0.0117 0.0094 0.0085 0.0131 0.0139 0.0180 0.0167 
 0.04780 0.03462 0.03427 0.05036 0.03695 0.04562 0.04640 0.03932 0.05462 0.05669 0.06049 0.05436 
 -0.0013 -0.0028 -0.0030 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0012 -0.0009 0.0009 
 0.0080 0.0047 0.0053 0.0111 0.0116 0.0074 0.0056 0.0059 0.0067 0.0073 0.126 0.0116 
 
Independent and control  
STRT 9.00 9.65 9.84 9.51 9.35 9.53 9.73 9.60 9.65 9.45 9.22 8.55 
 2.741 2.648 2.732 2.878 2.767 2.600 2.629 2.712 2.798 2.725 2.643 2.815 
 7.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 
 11.00 11.00 12.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 12.00 11.00 11.00 10.00 
 
LN_ASSETS 12.5496 12.2963 12.4204 12.4229 12.3714 12.4614 12.4876 12.5237 12.5099 12.6484 12.6998 12.8535 
 2.88842 2.77284 2.80637 2.83496 2.87405 2.91326 2.91785 2.89827 2.89882 2.92705 2.96467 2.91248 
 10.3806 10.2353 10.3683 10.3474 10.2523 10.3228 10.3712 10.3474 10.3356 10.4618 10.4855 10.7589 
 14.6936 14.3530 14.5447 14.5494 14.5688 14.6701 14.6704 14.7186 14.6903 14.8370 14.9574 15.0462 
 
F_LEV 0.2019 0.2684 0.2652 0.2959 0.2934 0.2989 0.2965 0.2952 0.3132 0.3234 0.3423 0.3429 
 0.50573 0.41882 0.36945 0.49713 0.42845 0.49279 0.49155 0.51015 0.53120 0.57284 0.55226 0.63611 
 0.0679 0.0651 0.0556 0.0580 0.0644 0.0657 0.0661 0.0695 0.0744 0.0707 0.0869 0.0833 
 0.3540 0.3407 0.3509 0.3626 0.3625 0.3415 0.3382 0.3427 0.3488 0.3576 0.3831 0.3638 
 
G_SALES 0.0869 0.4729 0.6030 0.2632 0.1501 0.2082 0.4111 0.3541 0.4764 0.3109 0.3258 0.0845 
 1.55151 2.00765 2.33684 1.34009 0.98068 0.84789 1.64984 1.41895 1.88117 1.17855 1.62023 1.10875 
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 -0.0411 -0.0438 -0.0125 -0.1115 -0.1263 -0.0203 0.0466 0.0147 0.0166 0.0078 -0.0251 -0.2055 
 0.2600 0.2999 0.4026 0.2290 0.1569 0.2178 0.2968 0.2926 0.3226 0.2797 0.2335 0.0805 
 
M_RISK 1.2400 1.3093 1.2921 1.2995 1.3408 1.3330 1.3530 1.3561 1.3379 1.3554 1.3109 1.3186 
 1.04217 1.03274 1.09075 1.02993 1.01333 0.99634 1.01084 1.07693 1.09749 1.12441 0.96841 0.97988 
 0.7800 0.7600 0.7600 0.7600 0.8000 0.8000 0.8200 0.7800 0.7700 0.7900 0.7850 0.7900 
 1.7000 1.6500 1.6200 1.6400 1.6900 1.7100 1.7200 1.7200 1.7200 1.7200 1.7100 1.7100 
 
Panel B: DACCR Sample (n=23,390) 
Variables All Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
1999 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2000 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2001  
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2002 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2003 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2004 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2005 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2006 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2007 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2008 
Mean 
SD 
25th(P) 
75th (P) 
2009 
Mean 
SD 
25th (P) 
75th(P) 
 
Dependent 
|DACCR| 0.1306 0.1399 0.1339 0.1469 0.1528 0.1422 0.1320 0.1330 0.1313 0.1337 0.1355 0.1590 
 0.05266 0.05547 0.05208 0.05932 0.05718 0.05090 0.04656 0.04736 0.04662 0.04834 0.05066 0.05736 
 0.1098 0.1060 0.1043 0.1126 0.1184 0.1145 0.1077 0.1080 0.1066 0.1073 0.1080 0.1213 
 0.1618 
 
0.1676 0.1554 0.1724 0.1783 0.1633 0.1519 0.1616 0.1495 0.1525 0.1549 0.1817 
Independent and control  
STRT 10.00 10.07 10.32 9.93 9.72 9.90 10.10 9.95 9.94 9.72 9.48 8.90 
 2.736 2.720 2.799 2.864 2.746 2.608 2.608 2.669 2.725 2.713 2.634 2.801 
 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 
 12.00 
 
12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 11.00 
LN_ASSETS 11.9673 11.7938 11.9202 11.9052 11.9185 12.0360 12.1024 12.2058 12.2266 12.3618 12.4368 12.5737 
 2.66724 2.58153 2.61929 2.67920 2.66835 2.64629 2.64082 2.60908 2.64544 2.72613 2.75291 2.69225 
 10.2087 9.9771 10.0300 9.9730 9.9501 10.1211 10.2579 10.3355 10.3350 10.4098 10.4438 10.6870 
 13.9653 
 
13.63034 13.7130 13.6995 13.7137 13.8348 13.8951 14.0169 14.0793 14.3214 14.3651 14.4459 
TL_TA 0.4328 0.5078 0.5114 0.5800 0.5901 0.5617 0.5443 0.5534 0.6013 0.6056 0.6665 0.6710 
 0.83857 0.57186 0.62996 0.79539 0.81595 0.68259 0.70288 0.75952 0.93121 0.88140 1.06246 1.31093 
 0.2332 0.2233 0.2041 0.2217 0.2368 0.2342 0.2297 0.2314 0.2441 0.2475 0.2643 0.2452 
 0.6451 0.6257 0.6230 0.6567 0.6688 0.6567 0.6334 0.6269 0.6365 0.6460 0.6892 0.6489 
24 
 
 
G_SALES 0.0878 0.4729 0.6796 0.2761 0.1513 0.2400 0.3843 0.3315 0.1723 0.2900 0.3153 0.0991 
 1.50464 1.810172 2.29496 1.53811 1.04288 1.23883 1.50521 1.37047 0.45614 1.14196 1.54893 1.21665 
 -0.0528 -0.0506 -0.0137 -0.1261 -0.1533 -0.0381 0.0327 0.0009 0.0143 -0.0022 -0.0285 -0.2098 
 0.2825 
 
0.3634 0.5063 0.2530 0.1675 0.2350 0.3212 0.3025 0.1927 0.2731 0.2377 0.0872 
G_PPE 0.0712 0.3123 0.4111 0.1849 0.0992 0.1055 0.1473 0.1289 -0.0911 0.2008 0.1349 0.0768 
 0.57701 0.80082 0.98835 0.58734 0.34386 0.40204 0.49591 0.46566 0.50948 0.60043 0.46011 0.24462 
 0.0040 0.0149 0.0212 -0.0033 -0.0092 0.0020 0.0132 -0.0113 -0.0859 0.0205 -0.0060 0.0003 
 0.1922 
 
0.2983 0.3616 0.2261 0.1590 0.1570 0.1628 0.1575 0.1185 0.2135 0.1896 0.1200 
CFO 0.0539 -0.0614 -0.0971 -0.1069 -0.0778 -0.0455 -0.0702 -0.0689 0.42 -0.0826 -0.0725 -0.0324 
 0.44417 0.40086 0.43423 0.46576 0.44888 0.38068 0.43042 0.43138 0.494 0.49309 0.44621 0.41397 
 -0.0893 -0.0826 -0.1336 -0.1374 -0.1036 -0.0818 -0.0937 -0.0838 0.00 -0.0738 -0.0622 -0.0203 
 0.1176 
 
0.1167 0.1035 0.1113 0.1191 0.1169 0.1160 0.1180 1.00 0.1211 0.1224 0.1301 
LOSS 0.00 0.44 0.47 0.56 0.54 0.49 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.49 
 0.499 0.496 0.499 0.496 0.498 0.500 0.494 0.493 0.494 0.495 0.499 0.500 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
             
 
Variable definitions: CON is based on the Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) measure of conservatism. STRT is the business strategy of firm i in year t based on the approach 
developed by Snow and Hambrick (1980). LN_ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i in year t.  
G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. M_RISK is a measure of 
systematic risk which shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is based on between 23 and 35 consecutive 
month end price percent changes and their relativity to a local market index. |DACCR| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). G_PPE is the growth rate of gross property plant and equipment (PPE), defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in 
prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. Loss takes the value of 1 if 
firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. 
  
25 
 
Table 3  Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: CON sample (n=14,729) 
Variables CON STRT LN_ASSETS F_LEV G_SALES M_RISK 
 
CON 
 
1 
     
 
STRT 
0.205*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
    
LN_ASSETS -0.338*** 
(0.000) 
-0.452*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
   
F_LEV 0.408*** 
(0.000) 
0.075*** 
(0.000) 
-0.239*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
  
G_SALES 0.086*** 
(0.000) 
0.279*** 
(0.000) 
-0.123*** 
(0.000) 
0.044*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
 
M_RISK -0.028*** 
(0.001) 
-0.047*** 
(0.000) 
0.076*** 
(0.000) 
0.033*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.882) 
 
1 
 
Panel B: DACCR sample (n=23,390) 
Variables |DACCR| STRT LN_ASSETS TL_TA G_SALES G_PPE CFO LOSS 
 
|DACCR| 
 
1 
       
 
STRT 
-0.301*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
      
LN_ASSETS -0.016** 
(0.016) 
-0.414*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
     
TL_TA 0.177*** 
(0.000) 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
-0.218*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
    
G_SALES -0.256*** 
(0.000) 
0.277*** 
(0.000) 
-0.091*** 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.226) 
 
1 
   
G_PPE -0.211*** 
(0.000) 
0.198*** 
(0.000) 
-0.023*** 
(0.001) 
-0.066*** 
(0.000) 
0.278*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
  
CFO -0.113*** 
(0.000) 
-0.395*** 
(0.000) 
0.480*** 
(0.000) 
-0.466*** 
(0.000) 
-0.126*** 
(0.000) 
-0.026*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
 
LOSS 0.130*** 
(0.000) 
0.398*** 
(0.000) 
-0.459*** 
(0.000) 
0.170*** 
(0.000) 
0.094*** 
(0.000) 
0.057*** 
(0.000) 
-0.441*** 
(0.000) 
 
1 
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Note: Two-tailed p-values are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable definitions: CON is based on the Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) accruals based measure of conservatism. STRT is the business strategy of firm i in year t measured by 
Snow and Hambrick (1980). LN_ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i in year t.  G_SALES is 
the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. M_RISK is a measure of systematic 
risk which shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end 
price percent changes and their relativity to a local market index.  |DACCR| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under Modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al. 1995). G_PPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in 
prior year for firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income 
before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 
 
OLS estimates of model (2) to test accounting conservatism: Pooled and annual samples 
 
CONit = β0 + β1STRTit + β2LN_ASSETSit + β3F_LEVit + β4G_SALESit + β5M_RISKit + Industry and Year controls +  εit (2) 
 
Variables All firms 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
1999 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2000 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2001 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2002 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2003 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2004 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2005 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2006 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2007 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2008 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2009 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
 
Intercept 
 
0.030*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.015** 
(0.021) 
 
0.028*** 
(0.005) 
 
0.011* 
(0.089) 
 
0.047*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.041*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.028*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.043*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.049*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.035*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.045*** 
(0.000) 
STRT 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.014**) 
0.001** 
(0.012) 
0.001** 
(0.014) 
0.001** 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.168) 
0.001** 
(0.040) 
0.001** 
(0.026) 
0.001* 
(0.072) 
0.002*** 
(0.010) 
0.002*** 
(0.005) 
0.001** 
(0.036) 
LN_ASSETS -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
F_LEV 0.033*** 
(0.000) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.041*** 
(0.000) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.033*** 
(0.000) 
0.031*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.042*** 
(0.000) 
0.030*** 
(0.000) 
0.041*** 
(0.000) 
0.039*** 
(0.000) 
G_SALES 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.732) 
0.001** 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.118) 
0.002** 
(0.023) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.061) 
0.000 
(0.998) 
-0.000 
(0.954) 
0.002 
(0.159) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.002* 
(0.064) 
M_RISK -0.001*** 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.126) 
-0.002*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.637) 
-0.001 
(0.495) 
-0.003** 
(0.018) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.647) 
-0.002* 
(0.040) 
0.001 
(0.253) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.033) 
Industry 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
N 14,729 1,180 1,277 1,337 1,347 1,359 1,409 1,410 1,510 1,519 1,233 1,148 
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.174 0.280 0.145 0.248 0.244 0.196 0.179 0.305 0.231 0.338 0.343 
F-Statistics 655.152**
* 
42.428*** 83.796*** 38.869*** 74.991*** 73.961*** 58.387*** 52.276*** 111.378*** 76.863*** 105.747 100.935**
* 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
 
Note: p-values are two-tailed. CON is based on the Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) accruals based measure of conservatism. STRT is the business strategy of firm i in year t based 
on the approach developed by  Snow and Hambrick (1980). LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets of firm i in year t.  G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. 
M_RISK is a measure of systematic risk which shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is based on between 
23 and 35 consecutive month-end price percent changes and their relativity to a local market index. 
  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
OLS estimates of model (3) to test earnings management: Pooled  and annual samples 
|DACCR|it = ά0 + ά 1STRTit + ά 2LN_ASSETSit + ά 3TL_TAit + ά 4G_SALESit + ά 5G_PPRit + ά 6CFOit + ά7LOSSit + IndustryandYearcontrols + εit (3) 
Variables All firms 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
1999 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2000 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2001 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2002 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2003 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2004 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2005 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2006 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2007 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2008 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
2009 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
 
Intercept 
 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.198*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.193*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.232*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.221*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.210*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.159*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.165*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.171*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.197*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.204*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.244*** 
(0.000) 
STRT -0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.000) 
LN_ASSETS 0.000 
(0.462) 
0.001 
(0.299) 
-0.000 
(0.925) 
-0.001* 
(0.096) 
-0.001*** 
(0.120) 
-0.001 
(0.229) 
0.001*** 
(0.002) 
0.001** 
(0.038) 
0.000 
(0.255) 
0.000 
(0.388) 
-0.001 
(0.116) 
-0.001 
(0.254) 
TL_TA 0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.149) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.060) 
0.002 
(0.182) 
0.001 
(0.186) 
G_SALES -0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.006*** 
(0.000) 
G_PPE -0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.000) 
-0.011*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.015*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.029*** 
(0.000) 
CFO -0.019*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.000) 
-0.015*** 
(0.000) 
-0.031*** 
(0.000) 
-0.022*** 
(0.000) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
-0.014*** 
(0.000) 
-0.020*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007** 
(0.014) 
-0.027*** 
(0.000) 
-0.020*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017*** 
(0.000) 
Loss 0.024*** 
(0.000) 
0.027*** 
(0.000) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
0.021*** 
(0.000) 
0.024*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.020*** 
(0.000) 
0.018*** 
(0.000) 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.030*** 
(0.000) 
Industry 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
N 23,390 1,980 2,143 2,245 2,224 2,276 2,363 2,322 2,282 2,190 1,745 1,620 
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.286 0.270 0.255 0.269 0.219 0.213 0.228 0.190 0.238 0.236 0.287 
F-Statistics 832.990**
* 
99.970*** 100.231*** 96.821*** 103.437**
* 
80.852*** 80.701*** 86.720*** 67.942*** 86.680*** 68.496*** 82.576*** 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
 
Note: p-values are  two-tailed. |DACCR| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). STRT is the 
business strategy of firm i in year t based on the approach developed  by Snow and Hambrick (1980). LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. 
F_LEV  is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year total assets of firm i in year t.  G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus 
sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. G_PPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE 
in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. Loss takes the value of 1 
if firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 6 
OLS estimates of models (4) and (5) to test the effect of wider economic environments  
on the relation between strategy and earnings quality 
 
CONit = β0 + β1STRTit + β2 GDP_Dummy + β3STRT* GDP_Dummy + β4 Ln_Assetsit + β5F_LEVit + 
β6G_SALESit + Industry_Dummy +  εit (4) 
|DACCR|it = ά0 + ά 1STRTit + ά 2 GDP_Dummy + ά 3STRT* GDP_Dummy + ά 4 LN_ASSETSit + ά 5F_LEVit 
+ ά 6G_SALESit + ά 7G_PPRit + ά 8CFOit + ά9LOSSit + Industry_Dummy + εit (5) 
Variables Earnings Quality 
CON |DACCR| 
Intercept 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.211*** 
(0.000) 
STRT 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
GDP_Dummy -0.000 
(0.983) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
STRT* GDP_Dummy -0.001*** 
(0.002) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
LN_ASSETS -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.734) 
F_LEV 0.026*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
G_SALES 0.001*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
G_PPE  -0.008*** 
(0.000) 
CFO  -0.022*** 
(0.000) 
LOSS  0.024*** 
(0.000) 
Industry_Dummy Yes Yes 
N 14,286 14,286 
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.252 
F-Statistics 904.204*** 481.176*** 
p-value <.001 <.001 
 
Note: p-values are two-tailed. .  
CON is the Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) accruals based measure of conservatism. |DACCR| is the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). STRT is the 
business strategy of sample firm i in year t based on the approach developed by  Snow and Hambrick (1980).  
GDP_Dummy is a binary variable coded 1  for high U.S. GDP growth years (1999, 2000 and 2004)  and 0  for 
low U.S. GDP growth years (2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009).  LN_ASSETS  is the natural logarithm of total assets 
of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year total assets of firm i in year t.  
G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by 
sales in prior year for firm i in year t. G_PPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in 
current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. 
CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. LOSS takes the value of 1 if firm i in 
year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7  OLS estimates of models (2) and (3) after excluding Technology sector from the samples  
 
CONit = β0 + β1STRTit + β2LN_ASSETSit + β3F_LEVit + β4G_SALESit + β5M_RISKit + Industry and Year 
controls +  εit (2) 
 
|DACCR|it = ά0 + ά 1STRTit + ά 2LN_ASSETSit + ά 3TL_TAit + ά 4G_SALESit + ά 5G_PPRit + ά 6CFOit + 
ά7LOSSit + Industry and Year controls + εit (3) 
 
Variables CON sample 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
|DACCR| sample 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Intercept  
0.041*** 
(0.000) 
0.161*** 
(0.000) 
STRT 0.001* 
(0.063) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
LN_ASSETS -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.295) 
F_LEV 0.041*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
G_SALES -0.000 
(0.851) 
-0.006*** 
(0.000) 
M_RISK -0.002* 
(0.045) 
 
G_PPE  -0.014*** 
(0.000) 
CFO  -0.008** 
(0.014) 
Loss  0.019*** 
(0.000) 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Year effects NA NA 
N 11,052 15,982 
Adjusted R2 0.325 0.165 
F-Statistics 125.378*** 37.142*** 
p-value <.001 <.001 
 
Note: p-values are two-tailed.   CON is based on the Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) accruals based measure of 
conservatism. STRT is the business strategy of firm i in year t based on the approach developed  by Snow and 
Hambrick (1980). LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV  is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets of firm i in year t.  G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year 
minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. M_RISK is a measure of 
systematic risk which shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. 
This coefficient is based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price percent changes and their relativity 
to a local market index.  |DACCR| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the 
Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995).  G_PPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE 
in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. 
CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in 
year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8  OLS estimates of models (2) and (3) using alternative measures of  conservatism and 
discretionary accruals  
 
CONit = β0 + β1STRTit + β2LN_ASSETSit + β3F_LEVit + β4G_SALESit + β5M_RISKit + Industry and Year 
controls + εit (2) 
 
|DACCR|it = ά0 + ά 1STRTit + ά 2LN_ASSETSit + ά 3TL_TAit + ά 4G_SALESit + ά 5G_PPRit + ά 6CFOit + 
ά7LOSSit + Industry and Year controls + εit (3) 
 
Variables CON sample 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
|DACCR| sample 
Coeff. 
(p-value) 
Intercept 0.025*** 
(0.000) 
0.196*** 
(0.000) 
STRT 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
LN_ASSETS -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.483) 
F_LEV 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
G_SALES 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
M_RISK -0.001*** 
(0.008) 
 
G_PPE  -0.009*** 
(0.000) 
CFO  -0.017*** 
(0.000) 
Loss  0.028*** 
(0.000) 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
N 14,729 23,390 
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.263 
F-Statistics 657.142*** 886.191*** 
p-value <.001 <.001 
 
Note: p-values are  two-tailed.  
 
CON is based on the Khan and Watts (2009) asymmetric timeliness measure of conservatism. STRT is the 
business strategy of firm i in year t based on the approach developed by Snow and Hambrick (1980). 
LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets of firm i in year t.  G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in 
prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. M_RISK is a measure of systematic risk which 
shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is 
based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price percent changes and their relativity to a local market 
index.   
|DACCR| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the Jones (1991) model. G_PPE 
is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and 
divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t 
scaled by total assets. Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary 
items and 0 otherwise. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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